Aesthetic Judgment of Built Form

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ABSTRACT

In the Third Critique Kant sporadically references architecture, built form, or similar man-made *purposeful artifacts*, using them to elucidate some points through examples, but often providing obscuring accounts. In some parts of the text he seems to suggest that the judgment of a building (or similar purposeful object) relies on how well the aesthetic qualities of form fit its intended purpose and thus can only be adherent beauty, and in other moments he seems to suggest that there could be a pure judgment if the purpose is unknown or abstracted from the object in question. Thus, what condition must architecture satisfy in order to be considered under Kant's category of pure beauty? Does architecture that transcends its intended purpose qualify, or does an aesthetic judgment about architecture require that one comprehend the purpose for which it was designed? And what role does form play in this judgment? This paper would like to explore the Kantian distinction between free and adherent beauty in relation to form and purpose in order to extract what might be Kant's position on the judgment of architecture.

JUDGMENTS OF TASTE; FREE AND ADHERENT BEAUTY

In the Third Critique Kant sporadically references architectural examples, or similar man-made *purposeful artifacts*, as a means to elucidate certain philosophical positions, yet these examples are often obscuring rather than clarifying. Therefore, Kant's position on how to make an aesthetic judgment about specific architectural constructs remains unarticulated; leaving a gap that this paper would like to address.

1.1 Conditions for a judgment of taste: pleasure, purpose, universality

If we were to analyze what constitutes an aesthetic judgment in the Third Critique we could extract three key moments that are particularly relevant to our path of investigation. These link aesthetic judgment to (1) pleasure (2) purpose and (3) universality. In the first instance, Kant asserts that a judgment of taste is a reflective judgment based on a disinterested feeling of pleasure (or displeasure); that is, we take pleasure in the object because we judge it beautiful, rather than judging it beautiful because we find it pleasurable. Secondly, judgments of beauty do not propose an end or purpose; with these judgments the principle of purposiveness is satisfied in a new and unique way, which we will discuss further on. Thirdly, judgments of taste are universal, because while maintaining their subjective quality (they are not cognitive judgments based on objective perception of an object, rather, they are determined by the subject making the judgment) judgments of beauty do claim certain objectivity. Thus one can assume that everyone who perceives the object will, or ought[1], to have the same judgment.

Despite the universal quality of judgments of beauty they are not based on concepts, therefore there are no rules or principals which one might use to judge something as beautiful. This also implies that these kinds of judgments cannot be proved. They have a *subjective universality* which demands that, without them being based on a concept, everybody share the same judgment and feeling of pleasure from the beautiful object. Kant argues that the kinds of faculties necessary for the contemplation of the beautiful are not that different from faculties needed for the judgment of ordinary things in the world; they still involve an *understanding*, which is responsible for concepts, and *imagination* which is responsible for intuition. But while in an ordinary judgment, imagination is

subsumed by understanding; in a judgment of taste the imagination is allowed free play, without the need for a concept.

From these three moments we can see how for Kant judgments of taste/ beauty are simultaneously subjective and objective, purposeful and without a purpose, particular and universal; in judgments of the beautiful we are looking at the subjective side of the object of perception. However these are aspects that look at the act of judgment, so if we now shift our perspective to the object of judgment, we could ask; what happens when our object of perception is an art that essentially emerges from the notion of purpose itself, as in the case of architecture?

1.2 Distinction between free and adherent beauty

For Kant judgments of taste, or *beauty*, can be pure or impure depending on the nature of the object being judged. Judgments can fail to be *pure* in two ways; firstly they can be influenced by the object's sensory or emotional appeal, that is, they can involve 'charm' or emotion[2] and secondly, they can be contingent to the concept one might have of the object.[3] This paper will focus on the second kind of impurity which is discussed in §16 in connection with a distinction between *free* and *adherent* beauty.

The distinction between these two principal kinds of beauties is centered on the notion of *concept.* In the first instance, free beauty does not presuppose a concept; it does not have an external purpose[4] or represent anything that can be cognized under a determinate concept. These kinds of objects are judged through their '*mere form'*, and entail a '*free judgment of taste'*. The second kind of beauty, is '*accessory to a concept*'; it is most often referred to as adherent beauty since it is ascribed to objects that are intended to fulfill a particular purpose. In these cases, Kant writes that our judgment of that object is dependent or determined by that purpose and by the concept we might have of its perfection, therefore it cannot be a pure aesthetic judgment of taste.

> *"the beauty of (…) a building (such as a church, palace, armory, or summer-house) does presuppose the concept of the purpose that determines what the thing is [meant] to be, and hence a concept of its perfection, and so it is merely adherent beauty"*[5]

The notion of perfection here is significant because it refers to the a priori image we might have of an object and an idea of what we expect that form must comply to. The examples he provides *a church, palace, armory, or summer-house*, all have a known external intended purpose. In §17 he also specifies that in the cases where we might not have exact knowledge of the intended purpose, as with the example of excavated archeological artifacts, it is enough to be aware that they were intended for a purpose and therefore "*we have no direct liking whatever for their intuition."* [6]

Here Kant seems to be saying that it is for the sake of the aesthetic judgment itself that one cannot abstract the concept of purpose of an object from the object; it is enough to know that the object was made with an intended purpose for it to qualify only as adherent beauty, if beauty at all. So how does one judge purposeful objects if their beauty is contingent to their purpose? It would seem to imply that we are judging the purpose itself, or rather how that purpose is manifested through the form of the object. But, as we will see further on, the relationship between form and purpose is more complex and nuanced than it is assumed to be here in the context of adherent beauty.

In Allison's account of §14 "*Elucidation by Examples*" he argues that judgments of adherent beauty may in fact contain, as a component, a pure judgment of beauty. [7] He illustrates this with Kant's example of the picture frame and its ornamentation. Here Kant claims that ornamentation (on the picture frame) which does not fall under '*finery*'[8] may be deemed beautiful by means of pure judgment even if contingent to a larger whole which is adherent to its function (the picture frame itself). Furthermore, he claims that this pure judgment may indeed increase our liking of the adherent whole. Allison argues that in such cases the aesthetic evaluation of the whole is subordinate to a more complex one which takes into account the object adhering to a purpose, and that the purity of this core judgment is not undermined by the object's falling under a concept.

Guyer, on the other hand, distinguishes between three interpretations of adherent beauty,[9] which offer differing positions around the debate of the relationship between function and form. In the first case, the imposition of function onto an object's form is seen as a necessary condition for the appreciation of an adherent object; secondly the pleasure given by both the function and the form of an object is greater than the pleasure that form or function alone can provide. And thirdly the interaction between form and function is seen as providing a special type of pleasure necessary for judging an adherent beautiful object. He seems to claim that Kantian aesthetic judgment is relative to

the context of that judgment and that *"the judgment of adherent beauty is genuinely aesthetic because the form of the object allows for a free play of our cognitive faculties within the limits set by its purpose"*[10]

As we can intuit from both Allison and Guyer's accounts, the relationship between purpose and form, or adherent and free beauty in Kantian terms, is not as clear-cut as might initially appear in the Third Critique, and this is particularly true within the context of built form.

1.3 Play of the imagination; abstraction

Kant claims that a judgment of pure taste: *"can show its greatest perfection in designs made by the imagination"*[11]*,* specifying that a concept would only restrict the freedom of our imagination at play. Therefore the faculty of the imagination at play seems to be another necessary condition for a pure judgment of beauty. The crucial question that arises in reading the Third Critique is: does Kant really mean to say that all objects inherently purposeful, inhibit the imagination at play? Are there any exceptions? And from all the objects or entities that can claim to be concept-free, which would be more conducive to a judgment of pure beauty, enabled for more play of the imagination?

In §16 Kant commends flowers, birds, crustaceans, designs à la grecque, wallpaper, and music without text, as free beauties because "*we like them freely and on their own account"*[12] undetermined by a concept we might have of them. He also refers to the beauties of human beings, horses, and buildings as presupposing a concept of perfection and hence being merely adherent or dependent beauties. The above examples Kant gives of *free beauty* are either of natural entities or of non-representational art; suggesting that judgments about representational art are judgments of adherent rather than free beauty, and thus are impure. This categorization seems to indicate that Kant holds nonrepresentational art to be superior to representational art, which has warranted some objection from authors who, like Allison and Ginsborg, have suggested that if this were to be the case then *"wallpaper designs are aesthetically more valuable than the ceiling of the Sistine Chapel."*[13]
Though expanding on this claim goes beyond the purpose of this paper, these objections are significant because they emphasize that the notion of abstraction for Kant is key to being able to judge an object aesthetically as a free beauty.

FORM, PURPOSE AND BEAUTY; INDETERMINACY

For Kant beauty necessarily resides in the form of the object. And while his paradigm of free beauty appears to pertain to the natural world, he sets conditions for the possibility of free beauty in art that are particularly tied to notions of purpose and abstraction of purpose.

2.1 Purpose and abstraction of purpose

In the section on the division of the fine arts, §51, Kant classifies architecture as a visual art, placing it together with sculpture under the heading of *"plastic art"*. But while in the fine arts of painting and sculpture there is no external intended purpose, the case of architecture appears to be different.

> *"Architecture is the art of exhibiting concepts of things that are possible only through art, things whose form does not have nature as its determinate basis but instead has a chosen purpose (…). In architecture the main concern is what use is to be made of the artistic object, and this use is a condition to which the aesthetic ideas are confined"*[14]

From this quote one might extract that Kant's position on the judgment of built form in general, and architectural constructs in particular, is quite clear and defined; architecture always has an external purpose and as such can only be judged in terms of its adherent beauty, with no possibility of a pure aesthetic judgment of taste since it will always be dependent of its purpose. However, this is highly questionable, not only because as we will discuss further on, the relationship between a building and its intended purpose is much more complex and fluctuating than Kant gives it credit for, but also by Kant's own account; *"Much that would be liked directly in intuition could be added to a building, if only the building were not [meant] to be a church."*[15]

Here he seems to be saying that a building could be given a pure judgment of beauty if only it were not *meant* to have a purpose. But, assuming that built form indeed has a purpose, are there instances where the judgment of it is not contingent to its purpose? Kant's account on nature and purpose gives us a clue on how this might be possible. Here he actually claims that all of nature can be judged independently of its function, giving the example of the flower and the botanist:

> *"Flowers are free natural beauties. Hardly anyone apart from the botanist knows what sort of thing the flower is [meant to]be; and even he, while recognizing it as the reproduce organ of a plant pays no attention to this natural purpose and judges the flower by taste"* [16]

If we were to apply the same logic Kant uses for natural beauties to artificial beauties[17], the above quote would in effect imply that if we were to "*pay no attention"* to the intended purpose of an object, we would be able to judge it (whether it has purpose or not) as a free beauty, and have a pure judgment of taste.

> *"A judgment of taste about an object that has a determinate intrinsic purpose would be pure only if the judging person either had no concept of this purpose, or if he abstracted from it in making his judgment."*[18]

It seems that even when an object "*that has a determinate intrinsic purpose"* obviously falling under the concept of an end, we appear to possess a power of abstracting it from that end.[19] Thus, a pure aesthetic judgment cannot result on approval of an object because it serves its intention, but there could be a pure aesthetic judgment if the purpose of the object in question is either unknown or abstracted. However, the key term in the above quote is "*intrinsic purpose"*. Here Kant seems to be allowing for abstraction of purpose in the case of objects which, like nature, only have an internal, intrinsic purpose. It is in these cases where one might still be able to judge the object as free beauty. But we have seen that his definition of architecture is centered on the idea of it having an external, extrinsic use.

Does this imply that there are no architectural built forms that can be considered as free beauty? Or are there some instances where a built form might be more conducive to abstraction of purpose than others? Does this capacity have to do with the form of the object or with the nature of its purpose? We will develop an answer to this question in the context of Kant's account of regular and irregular form, and indeed argue that the less regular and more indeterminate a form, the more potential it has for abstraction of purpose. Thus there are certain types of objects that can be judged as pure beauty by abstracting them from their purpose while others inhibit our power of abstraction. In the latter case, either these objects can never be beautiful, or their beauty is somehow related to their purpose so that, as claimed by Guyer, they can be judged beautiful within the limits set by their purpose.

However, the capacity for abstraction isn't just a quality of the object of observation; it also lies on the subject making the observation. Kant indeed puts forth the example of two people disagreeing when judging an object with a "*determinate intrinsic purpose*"; one person might either not know what the object's use is or have the ability to abstract its purpose, and thus claim that the object is a free beauty, while the other person might judge it according to its purpose and claim that its beauty is adherent to the purpose. Kant points out that both are correct within the context of their own interpretation of the object's purposiveness. Therefore the possibility for abstraction seems to lie on the bifold condition of the object allowing abstraction of purpose, and the subject possessing the power of abstraction.

In §14 Kant writes that ornamentation can add to beauty if it is not '*merely attached*', as in the case of finery. He provides the examples of ornamentation on a picture frame or drapery on statues, or colonnades around magnificent building (although one could certainly argue that drapery and colonnades actually do serve a purpose - but that is another debate altogether), implying that ornamented objects are deemed beautiful by means of pure judgment even if they are contingent to a larger whole which is adherent to its function. However if we were to attach gold decorations to a picture frame, these would not qualify as beauty, they would just be *finery*. This idea is further developed in Kant's example of New Zealanders' embellishing their bodies with tattoos; in themselves the tattoo design could be beautiful, but (although Kant doesn't state it this way) since they are *merely attached* to the human body they seem to fall under the category of *finery*.

Debates around the idea of ornamentation in architectural theory have been abundant, most notably headed by Adolf Loos in the early nineteen hundredths, who in his book *Ornament and Crime* argued against the florid style of his contemporary Secessionist architects and went as far as to state that using ornament in architecture was indeed a crime. Loos seems to be referring to Kantian 'finery' here, as a mere attachment to built form. Thus from a Kantian perspective we could distinguish between decoration applied to a functional form and decorative qualities that are either inherent, constitutive, or emergent from the form itself; one is extrinsic (applied) the other is intrinsic (generative of form). Examples of the latter could be extracted from the Gothic period in architecture, which used necessary structural and purposeful elements as decorative; as is the case of flying buttresses.[20] The former can be seen through the flourishing that Loos criticized in his Viennese contemporaries.


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2.2 Beauty and form; indeterminacy

Throughout the Third Critique, Kant has surprising accounts on geometry, regularity and irregularity. In some instances he claims that an object must not deviate from regular form, while in others he highly praises irregularity. Distinguishing the moments where he makes these claims is important for the elucidation of the question on how to judge built form. In his criticism of the explorer discovering a pepper garden amidst wild and irregular jungle landscapes, Kant claims that the regularity of the garden which the explorer praises would quite quickly, in the course of about a day, turn into boredom and constrain the imagination:

> *"the object ceases to entertain him and instead inflicts on his imagination an irksome constraint; whereas nature in those regions, extravagant in all its diversity to the point of opulence, subject to no constraint from artificial rules, can nourish his taste permanently"*

Here, order and regularity are experienced as constraints that do not allow for the free play of the imagination. Kant praises instead the extravagance, opulence and diversity of what he claims to be the untamed natural jungle. He mentions regular geometric forms, such as circles, as "*mere exhibitions of a determinate concept"*[21] which like the pepper garden display "*a stiff regularity (close to mathematical regularity)* and thus "*runs counter to taste"* because "*it bores us".* He goes on to praising that which "*lends itself to unstudied and purposive play by the imagination [which] is always new to us, and we never tire of looking at it."*[22]

If the object is overly regular, symmetrical, or rigidly structured, its form is already unfolded and presented in a cognizable fashion, which leaves no ambiguity as to what it is, or how it is intended to be used. In such cases, for Kant there cannot be any play of the imagination; no freedom, no beauty. It is the possibility of form, rather than form itself which according to Kant enables a pure aesthetic judgment of beauty. However, Gasché makes an important distinction that for Kant it is neither regularity and symmetry, nor irregularity and asymmetry that constitute the ideal beautiful form. *"Instead, a certain richness of the form itself, its indeterminateness, or dynamis (of possibilities), constitute that beauty"*[23]. In this light it would appear that Kantian ideal form is not opposite or symbiotic to function, it is irrespective of it; the object is the most beautiful the more abstract and

complex it is, with an indeterminacy which is crucial to its judgment as a free beauty. It is this *"exuberance of indeterminateness prior to any fixing of objective meaning"*[24] that Kant believes to be beautiful and enable a pure judgment of taste. The ideal Kantian beauty seems thus associated with the notion *of indeterminacy* of form for which free play of the imagination is a necessary condition.

2.3 Built form and purpose

However, while Kant makes his position on regular and irregular form quite clear, the examples he uses to clarify when one is needed over the other, are quite confusing. This is primarily because he compares the quality of one set of objects with the quality of the *judgment* of another set of objects. The first set of examples which illustrate when regularity is need are of objects "*possible only through an intention, such as a building or even an animal*"[25] and the second set are those that allow "free play of our presentational powers" such as "pleasure gardens, room decoration, all sorts of tasteful utensils".

We can clearly see that the first set describes just the object (buildings, animals) while the second set is already placing a judgment on the object in question (*pleasure* gardens, *tasteful* utensils).

Kant claims the first set of examples demand a regularity of form because they are contingent to their purpose, *or unity*; while the second set of examples should reject any regularity as that would be indicative of a constraint, once again reiterating his own judgment with further examples of "baroque *taste* in furniture" or "English *taste* in gardens"[26]. Yet, one could easily argue that a building is no more 'purposeful' than a piece of furniture or an English garden, and that the need for more or less regularity is simply rooted in the preconceived notions that the observer might have of how the object is intended to be used.

The common expression: "necessity is the mother of invention" is rooted in the assumption that inventions arise when society has an unfulfilled need; that it is this need (purpose or end) that drives the invention itself. In his book "Guns Germs and Steel" anthropologist Jarred Diamond questions this assumption. We assume that invention and building of artifacts arise from perceived needs, but as he puts it: *"In fact, many or most inventions were developed by the people driven by curiosity or by a love of tinkering, in the absence of any initial demand for the product they had in mind. Once a device had been invented, the inventor then had to find an application for it".*[27]

Thus how might one judge these inventions? Is their aesthetic quality any different when the invention was first created, without a purpose, than when it was ultimately attributed a use? Here we have reversed the usual roles of invention and need; artifact and purpose. Indeed, objects are also very often tested and used for purposes beyond what they were originally designed for. Similarly architectural built form is constantly repurposed and used for ends it was not necessarily designed for; they do not have such a one-to-one relationship with its intended purpose as Kant seems to assume.

Paradoxically it was one of the American architects who is most associated with designing highly ornate tall buildings who coined the phrase "*form follows function".* In his text *The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered* Louise Sullivan[28] writes:


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"It is the pervading law of all things organic and inorganic, of all things physical and metaphysical, of all things human and all things superhuman, of all true manifestations of the head, of the heart, of the soul, that the life is recognizable in its expression, that form ever follows function. This is the law."[29]

The phrase "*form ever follows function*", in its simplified version, became paradigmatic of an approach to designing architecture that focused primarily on the intended function of the building over any aesthetic considerations, particularly those tied to what was seen as mere decoration or ornamentation. But Sullivan himself neither thought nor designed along such dogmatic lines. And even those who claimed to follow this paradigm never really rid themselves from all non-functional elements, indeed such an attempt seems almost counter to human nature.[30]

Applying Kant's thesis here, that a form should avoid any regularity which might give it an air of constraint, one could argue that if a built form deviates enough from how it is expected to function, through a certain indeterminateness of form, then its original extrinsic purpose becomes somewhat intrinsic -intended but not immediately apparent- and as such the form can be judged abstracted from its purpose. In this context one may ask if the work of Frank Gehry is aesthetically more valuable because it does not look like its function and thus allows free play of the imagination, or is it less valuable because its form does not appear to 'fit' with its function?


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"when we pursue an aim (…) we require regular figures and those of the simplest kind; and here our liking does not rest direct on how the figure looks ,but rests on its usefulness for all sort of possible aims. A room whose walls form oblique angles, (…) all of these we dislike because are contrapurposive, not only practically with regard to some definite use of them, but contrapurposive also for our very judging of them with all sorts of possible aims [in mind]."[31]

Here Kant says that when we use "*common understanding"* in observing an object, be it a room, an animal, a garden, we may dislike the object if it deviates from the regularity that we expect the object to have, as in the case of a "*room whose walls form oblique angles".* But in judging something as a judgment of taste, then we do so irrespectively of the use. Thus it would seem that we could simultaneously dislike something because it doesn't serve its purpose well, but still judge it to be beautiful in a purposeless judgment of taste. Returning to the example of Gehry's work, he has indeed been criticized because the forms he designs don't conform to what the public might expect from a museum, or a concert hall for instnce, yet his work is widely recognized as being aesthetically valuable in its own right.


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Similarly if we were to look at the work of architect Daniel Libeskind who most certainly designs spaces "*whose walls form oblique angles"* we could make 'common understanding' comments on how well the design fits its intended purpose, and either like or dislike it; but in a judgment of taste we must look beyond what we expect its purpose to be and judge it for aspects that transcend its purpose. Indeed, the fact that the wall do for oblique angles and thus deviate from our expected connotation of a wall, enables us to abstract from its purpose and judge it as a potentially free beauty.

In a more extreme example, Duchamp's choosing to exhibit a toilet bowl[32] puts purpose and judgment into question. Under normal circumstances nobody would consider making a judgment of taste regarding a toilet bowl, most judgments will be based on a common understanding of how well or not it serves its function. It was not until Duchamp de-contextualized it by placing it in an art gallery, that suddenly people were expected to make judgments of taste, which necessarily could not be based on how well the object performed its intended function; they had to be based on terms that transcended the purpose for which it was designed.


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THE ARCHITECTURE OF INDETERMINACY

3.1 Closing remarks on built form and abstraction

If we look to Kantian aesthetics as a means to clarify aesthetic judgment for built space in general, and architecture in particular, his stance on beauty and purpose must necessarily be questioned. In the light of the examples put forth earlier, the question which remains is; can all judgments of architecture, be abstracted from its intended purpose, or are there some buildings that are absolutely contingent to their purpose?

Kant doesn't really give us insight into what his answer to such a question might be, but from his account on free and adherent beauty we could argue that it is those buildings that have a one-to-one relationship between their form and their function (purpose) that might indeed be impossible to abstract. In such cases, as soon as the function is taken away from the building, the building as such ceases to exist. But while this seems to make sense at a theoretical level, it is hard to think of any examples that might illustrate such an instance. Indeed, our position throughout the paper has been that the relationship between form and purpose in built space is much more complex and nuanced than Kant gives it credit for. Hence, the possibility of a one-to-one relationship between built form and function does not exist in the empirical world of matter.

One could thus conclude that indeed all built form has the capacity to be abstracted from its purpose, although the degree to which this might be possible can certainly vary. Kant's account on regularity and irregularity of form, or as Gasche' frames it, the indeterminacy of form, suggests that it is indeed this indeterminacy which controls the degree of abstraction possible; the more removed a form from the regular and predictable expectation of it, the more it qualifies to be judged as a free beauty under a pure aesthetic judgment if taste.

3.2 Judgment of built versus natural form

In this paper there have been certain assumptions and intentional omissions[33] directed to focusing the theme around the aesthetic judgment of built form. One of the most weighted questionable assumptions is the adoption of Kant's clear distinction between nature and culture. Indeed, he undoubtedly holds wild nature to be paradigmatic of pure beauty, often exhibiting difficulty reconciling

the possibility of *free beauty* beyond what he believes to be a natural entity. Furthermore, Kant seems to hold the Aristotelian formalist conception of form, whereby form is divorced from the matter which constitutes it. Indeed his judgments of taste seem to relate to form as independent of this matter; *"form seems to relate to the outer shape, the organization of the surface of a thing, as distinct from its matter."*[34] The distinction between form and matter emerges for the first time in the chapters on genius which, unlike the earlier chapters dealing largely with accounts of natural beauty; these chapters are primarily concerned with aesthetic judgment of works of art. While in natural organisms the part-whole relationship is understood materially, Kant seems to envision the part-whole relationship in art, formally; devoid of its material makeup.

Although from a contemporary viewpoint these Kantian categorizations can be seen as problematic, it is nevertheless valuable to ask why he thought natural entities to be aesthetically superior to man-made ones. In the light of the arguments developed in this paper, the reason appears to be bifold. On the one hand, nature can be judged irrespective of its purpose; because its purpose is seen to be only internally determined, intrinsic, and thus can be easily abstracted. On the other hand, nature has a particular relationship to form that, surprisingly, defies all idea of definiteness; valuing formlessness and indeterminateness over regularity and perfection. Yet, as Gashe' points out "*such form is still wildly rich in potential determinateness.*"[35] Thus, it is the capacity nature has to hold one's attention by never being quite determined in a particular cognizable form, yet embedding within its indeterminateness is the *potential* to acquire form.

As we have seen the Kantian account on how to judge purposeful artifacts aesthetically, is problematic in the context of architecture, firstly because the purpose prescribed to architectural constructs is never as fixed and defined as assumed by Kant, and secondly because built form cannot be understood devoid of its material manifestation. In architecture matter and form are intimately tied. However, these shortcomings don't overshadow the significance of Kant's contribution to judging architecture if we adopt his strikingly contemporary account on the beauty of form. This, we have seen, neither lies on the regular and symmetrical nor the irregular and asymmetrical but in an in between state of indeterminateness and formal exuberant that -to use a Deleuzian term-is in a state of continual *becoming.* This is one of the key reasons why Kant's work is still highly relevant to contemporary discourse in both architecture and art.

NOTES

[1] This is the idea of 'necessity' according to Kant
[2] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment,* §13
[3] Hannah Ginsborg, *Kant's Aesthetics and Teleology*, #2.5
[4] Difference between external and internal purpose will be discussed further on
[5] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment,*p.77
[6] Ibid.,p.84n
[7] Henry Allison, *Kant's Theory of Taste*,p.140-141
[8] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment,*p.72
[9] Paul Guyer: "Free and Adherent Beauty. A Modest Proposal", published in: "Values of beauty: historical essays in aesthetics" By Paul Guyer P.132
[10] Ibid.
[11] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment,* p.93
[12] Ibid., p.76
[13] Hannah Ginsborg, *Kant's Aesthetics and Teleology,* #2.5
[14] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment,*p.191
[15] Ibid., p.77
[16] Ibid.,p.76
[17] The distinction between natural and artificial is certainly questionable, but that is a debate that exceeds the purposes of this paper, so we will just limit our account to Kant's perspective of nature and built form as easily separable and identifiable.
[18] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment,*p.78
[19] Paul Guyer, *Interest, Nature, and Art: A Problem in Kant's Aesthetics*, p.21
[20] A flying buttress serves to transmit lateral forces, resulting from vaulted ceilings or from wind-loading on roofs, across an intervening space down to the foundation.
[21] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment,* p.92
[22] Ibid., p.93
[23] Rodolphe Gasche' *The Ideal Form: Rethinking Kant's Aesthetics*, p.66
[24] Ibid.
[25] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment,* p.93
[26] [Emphasis mine]
[27] Jarred Diamond, *Guns Germs and Steel*, p.244
[28] Louis Henri Sullivan (1856 –1924) was an was an influential American architect and critic part of the Chicago School, considered by many as the creator of the modern skyscraper.
[29] Louis H. Sullivan. *The Tall Office Building Artistically Considered*, March, 1896
[30] An eloquent example of this was the figure of Le Corbusier……
[31] Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment,* p.92
[32] Marcel Duchamp exhibited this work "Fountain" in 1917. It is one of the pieces which he called readymades (also known as found art), because he made use of an already existing object—in this case a urinal, which he titled Fountain and signed "R. Mutt. The work is regarded as a major landmark in 20th century art.
[33] Admittedly, this paper has not tackled the non-beautiful, the ugly, that which causes displeasure in its presentation, even though it is necessarily part of aesthetic judgment. However, Kant himself, with the exception of a few mentions to the grotesque, doesn't really tackle realm of aesthetics, therefore we esteemed it necessary to stay clear from it in order not to make baseless suppositions.
[34] Rodolphe Gasche' *The Ideal Form: Rethinking Kant's Aesthetics*, p.61
[35] Ibid., p.68

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ILLUSTRATIONS

1. Gothic flying buttresses of York Minster, UK
http://www.flickr.com/photos/ramson/1064117050/

2. Loius Sulivan's Bayard-condict building, New York
Bayard-condict_bldg_crop.jpg

3. Frank Gehry, Disney concert hall, Los Angeles
http://wvs.topleftpixel.com/photos/2008/07/gehry_disney_la_03.jpg

4. Studio Daniel Libeskind , Jewish Museum in Denmark
http://www.daniel-libeskind.com/#

5. Photograph of Marcel Duchamp's "Fountain"
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f6/Duchamp_Fountaine.jpg